Internal memory data protecting problems of the Renesas microcontrollers
https://doi.org/10.17586/2226-1494-2023-23-6-1247-1250
Abstract
The problem of protecting the information contained in the internal memory of the Renesas RL78 Family Microcontrollers is considered. The vulnerability of these microcontrollers has been identified and in vestigated, which allows extracting data from the built-in flash memory using a programmer. A method of automated recovery of the contents of the entire memory area, based on specially developed software, has been tested. The results of the study indicate the insufficient effectiveness of the access restriction measures implemented by the manufacturer. A variant of changing the programmer’s control command, leading to an increase in data security, is described. A technique for complete recovery of flash memory data is presented, tested in a program developed in the LabVIEW environment.
Supporting agencies: The work was supports by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation No. 075-01024-21- 02 dated 09/29/2021 (project FSEE-2021-0014).
About the Authors
K. K. Kondrashov
Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University “LETI”
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Kirill K. Kondrashov — Junior Researcher
Saint Petersburg, 197022
A. B. Levina
Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University “LETI”
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Alla B. Levina — PhD (Physics & Mathematics), Assiciate Professor, Associate Professor
Saint Petersburg, 197022
sc 56427692900
References
1. Tunstall M. Smart card security. Smart Cards, Tokens, Security and Applications. Springer, Cham, 2017, pp. 217–251. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50500-8_9
2. Spreitzer R., Moonsamy V., Korak T., Mangard S. Systematic classification of side-channel attacks: A case study for mobile devices. IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials, 2018, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 465–488. https://doi.org/10.1109/comst.2017.2779824
3. Kondrashov K.K., Denisov A.K., Luchinin V.V. Non-destructive method for ROM data monitoring via the energy consumption channel. Petersburg Electronics Journal, 2017, no. 2-3, pp. 97–102. (in Russian)
4. Skorobogatov S.P. Semi-invasive attacks — A new approach to hardware security analysis. University of Cambridge, Computer Laboratory. 2005. Technical Report No. 630. Available at: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-630.pdf. (accessed: 10.07.2023).
5. Kaur S., Singh B., Kaur H. Stratification of hardware attacks: Side channel attacks and fault injection techniques. SN Computer Science, 2021, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 183. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42979-021-00562-3
6. Luchinin V.V., Sadovaia I.M. Information Security of Smart Microsystems and Technologies. St. Petersburg, Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University “LETI” Publ., 2015, 157 p. (in Russian)
7. MSP430 Family of Microcontrollers. Usage Tips. Moscow, Kompel, 2005, 544 p. (in Russian)
8. Kondrashov K.K., Ershov M.I., Gasnikov A.O. Side-channel diagnostics for microprocessor devices: current state. Proceedings of Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University Journal, 2016, no. 3, pp. 3–9. (in Russian)
9. Alashik K., Efe A. Side channel attack. Gazi University Journal of Science. Part A: Engineering and innovation, 2019, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 61–73.
Review
For citations:
Kondrashov K.K., Levina A.B. Internal memory data protecting problems of the Renesas microcontrollers. Scientific and Technical Journal of Information Technologies, Mechanics and Optics. 2023;23(6):1247-1250. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.17586/2226-1494-2023-23-6-1247-1250
Views:
9
Email this article 